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Abstract
This Note argues that the adoption of FEMA should signal to the United States that there
is a need for a formalized agreement with Canada to minimize future discovery conflicts in civil
litigation. Part I analyzes the trend in the United States federal courts towards enforcement of
extraterritorial discovery orders. Part II discusses the ineffectiveness of pre-existing Canadian
blocking statutes in limiting United States discovery. Part III examines the underlying purposes of
FEMA’s enactment and argues that now is an appropriate time for the United States to enter into a
civil discovery treaty with Canada.
NOTES
RECENT CANADIAN BLOCKING LEGISLATION: A
VEHICLE TO FOSTER EXTRATERRITORIAL
DISCOVERY COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA?
INTRODUCTION
The increased enforcement of discovery orders beyond
the borders of the United States' has invoked considerable
criticism from Canada, which views these extraterritorial or-
ders as contrary to the principle of sovereign equality.2 Ac-
cordingly, Canada has taken steps to limit United States dis-
covery within its borders.' The latest in a series of Canadian
blocking statutes,4 the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
5
1. See, e.g., In re Socirt& Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th
Cir.) (discovery compelled in France), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 2888 (1986); United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th 1984) (discovery compelled in
Cayman Islands from Canadian banking corporation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106
(1985); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (discovery
compelled in Canada); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (discovery compelled in Canada, Australia, South Africa and Switzerland).
2. See Campbell, The Canada-United States Antitrust Notification and Consultation Pro-
cedure, A Study in Bilateral Conflict Resolution, 56 CAN. B. REV. 459, 482-3 (1978); Got-
lieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 459, 456-57
(1983). Canada's sentiments are in accord with the widespread objection in the inter-
national community to intrusive United States extraterritorial discovery. See 1 B.
HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPAR-
ATIVE GUIDE 696-98 (2d ed. 1986); Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver By Con-
duct-A Possible Response to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 6J. COMP. Bus.
& CAP. MKT. 1, 36 (1984) [hereinafter Fedders].
3. See, e.g., 3 CAN. CONS. REGS., ch. 366 (1978) [hereinafter SECURITY REGULA-
TIONS] (prohibit removal from Canada of materials relating to Canadian uranium
marketing activities during the period 1972-1975); ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 56 (1980)
[hereinafter ONTARIO ACT] (disallows transfer of business records from province at
request of foreign entity); QUE. REV. STAT. ch. D-12 (1977) [hereinafter QUEBEC ACT]
(prevents removal of business records from province at request of foreign entity); see
Note, Foreign Blocking Legislation: Roadblocks to Effective Enforcement of American Antitrust
Law, (1981) ARIZ. ST. L.J. 945 n.5 [hereinafter Note, Foreign Blocking Legislation]; see
also 1 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 723 (recent Canadian blocking legislation is more
extensive than any others).
4. See supra note 3. Discovery blocking statutes seek to limit compliance with
foreign requests for business records and can include provisions holding foreign an-
titrust judgments unenforceable. See Fedders, supra note 2, at 35; Note, Shortening the
Long Arm of American Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28
Loy. L. REV. 213, 214 n.6 (1982).
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(FEMA), can potentially eliminate foreign document discovery
in Canada.6
This Note argues that the adoption of FEMA should signal
to the United States that there is a need for a formalized agree-
ment with Canada to minimize future discovery conflicts in
civil litigation. Part I analyzes the trend in the United States
federal courts towards enforcement of extraterritorial discov-
ery orders. Part II discusses the ineffectiveness of pre-existing
Canadian blocking statutes in limiting United States discovery.
Part III examines the underlying purposes of FEMA's enact-
ment and argues that now is an appropriate time for the
United States to enter into a civil discovery treaty with Canada.
I. AMERICAN EXTRA TERRITORIAL DISCOVERY
JURISDICTION
It is an established principle in the United States that its
courts may order the production of documents in foreign
countries, if the court has in personam jurisdiction over the
party in control of the documents.7 However, whether or not a
United States court will exercise this power, when presented
with a conflicting foreign law, is not as clear.
A. Traditional Approach
In Sociti Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Com-
merciales, S.A. v. Rogers,8 the plaintiffs refused to surrender doc-
uments located in Switzerland, arguing that to do so would vi-
olate Swiss penal and secrecy laws.9 In response, the United
States district court penalized the plaintiffs by dismissing the
5. CAN. STAT. ch. 49 (1985).
6. Id. § 4 (Attorney General of Canada permitted to seize discovery documents
if there is reason to believe a blocking order issued pursuant to the statute will not be
honored).
7. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1968); see In
re Soci6t& Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
106 S.Ct. 2888 (1986); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341,
345 (7th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.)
(Sodet Internationale did not absolutely bar extraterritorial discovery which violates
foreign law), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
8. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
9. The Swiss laws at issue were Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code which is
concerned with the divulgence of business secrets and Article 47 of the Swiss Bank-
ing Law which relates to the secrecy of bank records. Id. at 199-200.
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action' and the court of appeals affirmed." The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the discovery order,
notwithstanding the Swiss statutes, and set forth three factors
that governed its decision: 1) the strength of United States in-
terests; 2) the importance of the documents to the litigation,
and 3) the nationality of the party required to produce the rele-
vant documents.' 2  However, the Supreme Court overturned
the dismissal and ordered the suit reinstated reasoning that the
plaintiffs made extensive efforts in good faith to comply with
the order,13 and finding that "a fear of criminal prosecution
constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction."'' 4
In the years immediately following Socigti Internationale, the
predominant view in the United States federal courts was that
production orders that require parties to violate foreign laws
should not be enforced.' 5 The proponents of this comity
view" expanded upon the rule-previously set forth by the
10. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 438 (D.D.C. 1953), aff'd as modified sub nom.
Socirt6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v.
Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd sub nom. Socirt6 Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
11. Socit6 Internationale Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v.
Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd sub nom. Soci6t6 Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
12. Sociite'Internationale, 357 U.S. at 204-06.
13. Id. at 211-12.
14. Id. at 211.
15. See, e.g., In re Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612 (2d
Cir. 1962); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank
v. Internal Revenue Serv., 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948
(1960)
The formula emerging from these cases may be summarized as follows:
Where production of records located in another country would place the
witness ordered to furnish them in jeopardy of criminal liability under the
laws of the country, the duty to proceed by appropriate process within the
foreign country shifts to the party seeking production, while a vague duty to
"cooperate" remains with the addressee of the subpoena. The only evidence
necessary to cause this shift is proof of the foreign prescription and, in the
face of such evidence, other factors appear irrelevant.
Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdiction Where Law of Situs Prohibits
Removal, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 300 (1962).
16. See generally Note, Compelled Waiver of Bank Secrecy in the Cayman Islands: Solution
to International Tax Evasion or Threat to Sovereignty of Nations?, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 680,
715 n. 158 (1986); Comment, Ordering Production of Documents from Abroad in Violation of
Foreign Law, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 791, 794-96 (1964). "Comity is a nation's expression
of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to international duty and con-
venience and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws." United States v.
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Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez, 7 -that courts of the
United States should not examine the validity of a foreign sov-
ereigns' acts within the sovereigns' borders.' 8
B. Modern Approach
United States federal courts now look beyond the mere
existance of a foreign blocking law in determining whether to
enforce extraterritorial discovery orders.' 9 The comity view
presently lacks support because its deferential stance disre-
gards the interests of the United States and, in effect, allows
local law to be dictated by foreign law.20 The prevailing mod-
ern approach is factor analysis, set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States2'
(Restatement Second), which is used to determine the appro-
Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1390 (11 th Cir. 1982) (quoting Somportex, Ltd.
v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1017 (1972)), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
17. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
18. See id. at 252.
19. For a broad discussion of current judicial approaches to the treatment of
foreign blocking laws, see Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good
Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320, 1327-1339 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Extraterritorial
Discovery]; Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Exami-
nation and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 887-903
(1982) [hereinafter Note, Compelling Production]; Note, Strict Enforcement of Extraterrito-
rial Discovery, 38 STAN. L. REV. 841, 853-74 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Strict Enforce-
ment].
20. See, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1389-1391 (11th
Cir. 1982) (deferring to foreign law would emasculate the grand jury process), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342
(10th Cir. 1976) (adopting a comity approach would create an anomalous situation
whereby foreign law would control local law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977);
S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing for-
eign entity to do business in the United States then resist accountability for its actions
claiming anonymity under foreign law would be a travesty of justice); see also Note,
Extraterritorial Discovery, supra note 19, at 1328; Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 19,
at 855-56.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND]. The Restatement Second
has been revised since 1965. See infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussion of
the Restatement Revised Tentative Draft No. 7 factorial approach). The following
cases demonstrate the widespread use of the Restatement factor approach in the fed-
eral courts: In re Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.),
cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 2888 (1986); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d
817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
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priateness of sanctions in a case of noncompliance, as well as
the validity of discovery orders.22 The Restatement Second
approach requires an examination of a wide number of factors,
including a balancing of national interests. 3 In practice, the
scale often tips towards the United States because the usual
outcome favors the enforcement of the discovery order.2 4
A more stringent factorial approach is based on the Societi
Internationale decision.2 5 This approach does not call for the
22. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); In
re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); Garpeg, Ltd. v. United
States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
23. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 21, § 40 requires an examination of five
factors:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states;
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforce-
ment actions would impose upon the person;
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state;
(d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reason-
ably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that
state.
Various federal courts have expanded upon the Restatement Second approach
using the five factors, as well as principles from the Sociiti Internationale decision. See
United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1332 (9th Cir.) (in addition to the Re-
statement factors, court examined the importance of the documents to the litigation),
aff'd, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); S.E.C. v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (considered good faith of
non-producing party, as well as Restatement factors, when determining appropriate-
ness of sanctions).
24. See, e.g., In re Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th
Cir.) (district court properly ordered defendants to comply with plaintiff's discovery
requests, despite existence of French blocking statute), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 2888
(1986); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11 th Cir. 1984) (upheld
fine of US$1,825,000 against Canadian bank for failure to comply with grand jury
subpoena, despite bank's assertion that compliance would violate Cayman Islands
bank secrecy laws), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); United States v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granted motion to compel pro-
duction of summoned documents, despite potential violations of Hong Kong bank
secrecy law); see also United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (upheld
order requiring defendant to direct Cayman Islands bank to disclose his records,
even though bank was subject to criminal liability under Cayman Law).
25. Socit6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); see, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F.
Supp. 1138, 1145-48 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (court interpreted holding in Sociiti Internatio-
nale to advocate a factorial approach that excludes an examination of the interests of
the foreign government in its blocking legislation and limits its inquiry to different
factors depending upon the stage of the controversy).
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examination of the interests of the foreign country.26 Instead,
it utilizes a similar dissected mode of analysis found in Sociiti
Internationale.2 7 At the discovery order issuance stage, the in-
terests of the United States, document importance and the
flexibility of the foreign government in the enforcement of its
blocking law are reviewed. 28 In determining whether to sanc-
tion a noncomplying party, the examination is limited to a con-
sideration of the non-producing party's overall conduct.2 9 The
most recent draft of the Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Restatement Revised) ad-
vocates a factorial approach that essentially incorporates the
Restatement Second and the Socigti Internationale dissected ap-
proach.3 0
The discretionary nature of these factorial approaches has
led to increasing judicial enforcement of United States extra-
territorial discovery orders.3 ' Although both the Restatement
Second and the Restatement Revised require the United States
judiciary to evaluate the importance of the interests of the
United States against those of the foreign government, 32 the
federal courts have demonstrated that there exists a predispo-
sition to favor United States interests.3 The wide adoption of
26. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
27. See supra notes 1 1-13 and accompanying text.
28. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1154-56, in which the court
determined that a discovery order should issue compelling the defendants to pro-
duce documents located abroad after a consideration of the strength of United States
interests in the litigation, the importance of the documents to the controversy and
the degree of leniency in the application of the foreign blocking laws at issue.
29. See General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 307 (S.D. Cal.
1981) (upheld imposition of sanctions against plaintiff, despite Canadian blocking
legislation, after a finding that relevant documents were purposefully housed in Can-
ada in anticipation of United States antitrust litigation).
30. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES § 437 (Tent. Draft No. 7 1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT REVISED]. The Re-
statement Revised maintains the Restatement Second factors, but only to the extent
of determining whether a discovery order should issue. Id. § 437(l)(c). When deter-
mining whether to impose sanctions the Restatement Revised limits the inquiry to a
review of the good faith of the non-producing party. Id. § 437(2)(a)(b).
31. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.),
aff'd, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); In re Uranium Anti-
trust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I1. 1979).
32. See RESTATEMENT REVISED, supra note 30, § 437(1)(c); RESTATEMENT SEC-
OND, supra note 21, § 40(a).
33. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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blocking statutes internationally34 is intended to offset this
trend. 5
II. CANADIAN BLOCKING LEGISLATION
Three Canadian blocking statutes existed before the en-
actment of FEMA.3 6 They include two provincial statutes, the
Ontario Business Records Protection Act 37 (Ontario Act) and
the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act38 (Quebec Act)
and, one federal blocking statute, the Canadian Uranium In-
formation Security Regulations 3  (Security Regulations).
These early statutes were promulgated to thwart United States
antitrust investigations.40
A. The Ontario and Quebec Acts
The Ontario Act was passed in response to a Sherman
Act41 antitrust investigation in which a United States grand
jury issued a subpoena for records relating to the Canadian
paper and pulp industry.42 Over fifty Canadian companies
were subject to the order.43 The Ontario government pro-
tested, believing the order to be a clear violation of the prov-
ince's sovereignty.4 4 Thus, the Ontario Act was enacted to
serve as a defense mechanism against future instances of intru-
34. See Fedders, supra note 2 (by 1984 at least twenty-six countries had enacted
discovery blocking statutes).
35. See 1 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 718-19; Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 19,
at 846-49; Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Liti-
gation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 613 n.5 (1979).
36. CAN. STAT. ch. 49 (1985).
37. ONTARIO ACT, supra note 3.
38. QUEBEC ACT, supra note 3.
39. SECURITY REGULATIONS, supra note 3.
40. See infra notes 41-46, 60-64 and accompanying text.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is to be declared illegal .... " Id. § 1. (emphasis added).
42. See Fedders, supra note 2, at 36; Note, Foreign Blocking Legislation, supra note 3,
at 951; Note, Shortening the Long Arm, supra note 4, at 253; Note, Taking Evidence Abroad,
8 TEX. INT'L L. J. 57, 80 (1973) [hereinafter Note, Taking Evidence Abroad].
43. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522, 529 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), aff d, 243 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
44. Id. The Premier of Ontario commented: "no citizen of the United States
should forget that Canadians are just as proud of their own nationality and just as
jealous of their own sovereignty as is any citizen of their own country." Id.
1987]
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sive United States extraterritorial discovery.45 Quebec, soon
after, enacted a substantively similar blocking law for much the
same reason.
46
The Ontario and Quebec Acts are similar in scope. They
each prohibit the removal from the provinces of all materials
relating to any business carried on within their respective juris-
dictions, at the request of an order or subpoena from any legis-
lative, administrative or judicial authority outside the prov-
ince.47 The statute, however, is not self-enforcing because a
provincial court order must issue before one can be criminally
liable for complying with a foreign discovery request.48 De-
spite their enforcement provisions, the Ontario and Quebec
Acts provide a number of exceptions which tend to emasculate
their potential effectiveness in limiting foreign discovery. 49
These provincial statutes have rarely been invoked in
United States litigation. In fact, treatment- of the Ontario Act
by the federal courts has been merely incidental. Recent cases
are exemplary. In both General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co.5"
and In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,5' the Ontario Act was
raised as a bar to Canadian discovery.52 The courts, however,
never addressed the validity of the statute because a provincial
court order had never issued. Therefore, the defendants
45. See 130 Canadian Sen. Deb. 359 no. 18 (Dec. 18, 1984) [hereinafter Senate
Debates].
46. See Fedders, supra note 2, at 36; Note, Foreign Blocking Legislation, supra note 3,
at 951; Note, Shortening the LongArm, supra note 4, at 253; Note, Taking Evidence Abroad,
supra note 42, at 80 n.152.
47. ONTARIO ACT, supra note 3, § 1; QUEBEC ACT, supra note 3, § 2.
48. ONTARIO ACT, supra note 3, § 2; QUEBEC ACT, supra note 3, §§ 4 & 5.
49. See Petruska v. Johns-Manville Corp., 83 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
American Indus. Contracting Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880
(W.D. Pa. 1971). Both statutes allow documents to leave their respective provinces
if: (a) the company or agency is furnishing them to its head office or affiliate consis-
tent with regular business practices; (b) the request is from a company engaged in the
sale of securities within the province and the documents are being sent to another
jurisdiction where the sale of the securities of the company has been also authorized;
(c) a broker or security issuer doing business in the province is sending them to an-
other territory where it is licensed to similarly operate, or (d) it is authorized by the
law of the province or the Canadian Parliament. ONTARIO ACT, supra note 3, § 1 (a)-
(d); QUEBEC ACT, supra note 3, § 3(a)-(d).
50. 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
51. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
52. General Atomic, 90 F.R.D. at 294; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at
1143.
53. 90 F.R.D. at 294; 480 F. Supp. at 1143.
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would not have been penalized, pursuant to the statute, for
complying with the discovery order.
The Quebec Act was successful in blocking United States
discovery in the earliest case in which it was raised in defense
of non-production of documents. 54 The court stated that pro-
duction of foreign records should not be ordered where it
would cause "a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or,
at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its proce-
dures. ' 55 Nevertheless, in later decisions, the Quebec Act
proved to be ineffective.5 6 In one action, a United States dis-
trict court held the statute inapplicable since the information
requested would be in the possession of the United States par-
ent corporation in the ordinary course of business, rather than
the Canadian subsidiary.5 7 Thus, the discovery request came
within the purview of one of the statutory exceptions which al-
lows the removal of documents if the company or agency is
furnishing them to its head office or affiliate consistent with
ordinary business practices. 58 Similarly, in another case the
court was able to circumvent the Quebec Act by taking a strict
reading of its statutory provisions.59
B. The Security Regulations
The Security Regulations resulted from a United States
Department of Justice investigation of alleged price fixing
among certain producers and suppliers of uranium, both in-
side and outside the United States.60 Soon after the com-
54. See Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
55. Id. at 152.
56. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
57. See American Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp.
879, 880 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
58. See id.
59. See Petruska v. Johns-Manville Corp., 83 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The
court upheld a production order directed at documents located in Quebec, finding
that the order did not violate the Quebec Act. Id. at 36. The court noted that a
provincial court order to block discovery was never obtained, and there was no indi-
cation that the Act would be violated if: 1) the defendants made copies of the relevant
documents or 2) the defendants made the documents available in Quebec, instead of
in the United States. Id.
60. 1 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 549-50. For a general discussion of this contro-
versy, see J. TAYLOR & M. YOKELL, YELLOWCAKE: THE INTERNATIONAL URANIUM CAR-
TEL AND ITS AFTERMATH (1979); Comment, The International Uranium Cartel: Litigation
& Legal Implications, 14 TEX. INT'L LJ. 59 (1979).
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mencement of the investigation, the Canadian Legislature
adopted the Security Regulations, pursuant to the authority of
Canada's Atomic Energy Control Act,6 1 to suppress the re-
moval of materials relevant to the Canadian uranium indus-
try.6 2 The regulations have limited applicability, unlike the
provincial statutes. They prevent the removal from Canada of
information relating to uranium marketing activities during the
period from 1972 to 1975.63 The legislature sought to block
the United States investigation because the Canadian Govern-
ment apparently had encouraged its uranium producers to par-
ticipate in an informal marketing arrangement to assist its fail-
ing uranium industry.64
The Security Regulations were invoked by several parties
seeking to block extraterritorial discovery in Canada in the en-
suing United States litigation concerning the alleged cartel ac-
tivities, but the regulations were only partially successful.6 5 In
In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,66 a United States appellate court
refused to uphold a contempt ruling against a United States
corporation that did not comply with a discovery order con-
cerning documents located in Canada.67 After a balancing of
United States and Canadian interests, fear of violating the Ca-
61. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-19 (1970).
62. SECURITY REGULATIONS, supra note 3, § 2. In 1975, the Canadian Legislature
also amended its domestic antitrust law to allow Canadian nationals at the direction
of the Restrictive Trade Pratices Commission to disregard those foreign orders, laws
or decrees that would adversely affect national interests. Note, supra note 4, at 255.
63. SECURITY REGULATIONS, supra note 2, § 2. Any knowing violation could sub-
ject a party to criminal prosecution punishable by imprisonment for up to five years
and/or a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars. Id.
64. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 D.L.R.3d 3, 24, 16 O.R.2d 273, 292
(Ont. High Ct. of Justice 1977). With the passage of the Security Regulations, the
Minister of Energy and Resources for Canada issued a press release indicating gov-
ernment involvement in an uranium marketing arrangement to assist Canada's ailing
uranium producers. Id. at 280. The press release implied that the United States con-
tributed to Canada's uranium marketing problems, stating
The problems were compounded by United States policies which closed
the large U.S. market to foreign uranium, and at the same time moved ura-
nium from the U.S. government stockpile into the international market
through conditions imposed on foreign users of U.S. uranium enrichment
facilities. Concurrently, U.S. corporations were competing aggressively for
sales outside of their protected domestic market.
Id.
65. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
66. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 999.
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nadian statute was deemed a valid excuse for non-produc-
tion.68 The court believed that Canada had a legitimate "na-
tional interest" in blocking the discovery request.69
In contrast, the court in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation 70
upheld plaintiff's motion to compel the production of docu-
ments in Canada despite the Security Regulations. 71 In the
court's view, they were promulgated for "the express purpose
of frustrating the jurisdiction of the United States courts over
the activities of the alleged international uranium cartel." 72
Thus, both the Ontario and Quebec Acts have proven to
be relatively ineffective in preventing the enforcement of
United States extraterritorial discovery orders. 7" This ineffec-
tiveness stems from the fact that they: 1) are provincial rather
than national statutes; and therefore, have arisen infrequently
in United States federal litigation proceedings;74 2) contain
broad exceptions, 75 and 3) are not self-enforcing. 76 Canada's
federal Security Regulations have also been unavailing because
of their limited scope 77 and the suspect nature of their valid-
ity. 78 Hence, despite the many attempts to combat intrusive
United States discovery orders, Canada remained unsuccessful
at protecting its citizens from the aggresive overreach of
United States courts.
C. The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
The enactment of FEMA,79 Canada's first generally appli-
cable federal blocking statute, is the result of a history of futile
Canadian attempts to thwart intrusive United States discovery
orders.80 The statute is designed to put Canada on an equal
footing with the United States in matters of extraterritorial dis-
68. See id.
69. Id. at 998.
70. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
71. id.
72. Id. at 1143.
73. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
74. See id.
75. ONTARIO ACT, supra note 3, § I(a)-(d); QUEBEC ACT, supra note 3, § 3(a)-(d).
76. ONTARIO ACT, supra note 3, § 2; QUEBEC ACT, supra note 3, §§ 4-5.
77. SECURITY REGULATIONS, supra note 3, § 2.
78. See supra notes 72 and accompanying text.
79. CAN. STAT. ch. 49 (1985).
80. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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covery, so that Canadian interests will not continue to be ig-
nored by the United States courts. 8t The statute is, in effect, a
policy statement signalling to the United States that Canada is
committed to protecting itself from United States discovery
that infringes on Canadian sovereignty.8 2 The hope of the Ca-
nadian government is that it will have a preventive effect, in that
the United States will finally be forced to consider the concerns
of Canada more seriously in relation to the extraterritorial ap-
plication of United States discovery orders.8a
FEMA is more extensive than its predecessor blocking
statutes. 84 It prohibits, upon an order of the Canadian Attor-
ney General, not only the disclosure of records in Canada, but
also of documents located outside Canada if they are under the
control of a Canadian citizen or resident.8 5 The Attorney Gen-
eral can restrict any act in Canada that would facilitate the pro-
duction or identification of such records to a foreign entity.86
Moreover, he may obtain a court order to seize records located
in Canada if evidence indicates that a non-production order
will not be obeyed.8 7 The statute also can prevent the enforce-
ment or recognition of foreign antitrust judgments in Cana-
dian courts88 and contains a "clawback provision," which per-
mits Canadian citizens, residents and corporations to sue for
the return of all or part of a foreign antitrust judgment that
they have paid. 89 Additionally, the statute allows the Canadian
81. 1 Canadian H.C. Deb. 1180, 1189 (Dec. 13, 1984) [hereinafter House of
Commons Debates] in which Mr. Ian Waddell representing Vancouver-Kingsway
stated:
We feel very strongly that we must be careful because we do not have an
equal relationship with our great friends in the United States. The United
States is a huge empire and we have become and are becoming more and
more its colony. ... [W]hen you are dealing with the Americans, it is like
having the elephant dancing among chickens; every fellow for himself.
Id.
82. See Senate Debates, supra note 45, at 360.
83. See id. at 361 ("It may perhaps even be said that the type of legislation em-
bodied in [FEMA] has a preventive effect, in that it signals to the outside world the
concern of the Government of Canada with problems arising from extraterritorial
application of foreign law.").
84. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
85. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 3(l)(a) (1985).
86. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 3(l)(b) & (c) (1985).
87. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 4 (1985).
88. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 8 (1985).
89. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 9 (1985).
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government to respond in other situations involving intrusive
foreign extraterritorial action.90 Penalties, which may include
a five year jail sentence, are provided for violators to ensure
compliance with orders issued pursuant to the statute.9'
III. FEMA AND THE NEED FOR A TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING
EXTRA TERRITORIAL DISCOVERY
A. The Legislative History of FEMA and the Need for a Treaty
Blocking measures are . . . used frequently as, arms pro-
grams by which countries provide themselves with negotiat-
ing weapons in diplomatic consultations to force com-
promises rather than as measures to block completely for-
eign [discovery] investigations.9 2
Canada was hesitant to adopt FEMA, and had considered a
similar statute more than three years before FEMA was finally
promulgated. 3 This reluctance demonstrates the Canadian
belief that cooperation and consultation are the preferred
routes to the settlement of controversies between nations. 4
Canada has statutes that call upon its courts to render assist-
ance to foreign courts seeking evidence 5 and is open to the
resolution of discovery conflicts through diplomatic chan-
nels. 6 However, the Canadian legislature believed, because of
90. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 5 (1985). For example, the Attorney General of Can-
ada, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State of External Affairs, can prevent
Canadian companies that are foreign owned or controlled from complying with ex-
port requirements set by those foreign countries. Senate Debates, supra note 45, at
362. The effects of this statute on other extraterritorial orders are beyond the scope
of this Note and will not be discussed.
91. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 7 (1985). The statutory penalties include a maximum
five year jail sentence and/or a ten thousand dollar fine. Id.
92. 1 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 736.
93. See House of Commons Debates, supra note 81, at 1181. The statute was
introduced earlier under the title Foreign Proceedings Judgments Bill. See Pettit &
Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
Law, 37 Bus. LAW. 697, 708 (1982).
94. See Senate Debates, supra note 45, at 361; see also Gotlieb, supra note 2, at
459-60.
95. E.g., Canada Evidence Act, R.S. 1970, c.307, § 43; Ontario Evidence Act,
R.S.O. 1960, c.125 § 58(1); Quebec Special Procedure Act, R.S.Q 1941, c.342 § 16,
reprinted in 2 B. RIsTAu, INTERNATIONALJUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL)
(1986).
96. Senate Debates, supra note 45, at 361.
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its previous inability to block intrusive United States discovery
orders, that "such co-operation and consultation will be best
assured only if Canada has the statutory authority to block uni-
lateral measures of extraterritoriality. 9
7
Presently, Canada is committed to renewing its relation-
ship with the United States, a relationship it believes has dete-
riorated in recent years, 98 and endorses a policy intended to
increase foreign investment in Canada.99 The statute comple-
ments these goals because future conflicts can be avoided and
diplomatic ties strenghthened by leading the United States to
the negotiating table.'00
FEMA is clearly meant to be used as a last resort.' 0 ' It was
not promulgated for the express purpose of blocking discovery
requests of the United States, but to foster cooperation be-
tween the two countries. The statute is purposely not self-en-
forcing and is triggered only after the Attorney General of
Canada issues specific orders.'0 2 Such orders will issue if, in
his opinion, a foreign tribunal has or is likely to exercise juris-
diction in a manner that adversely affects Canadian business
interests or that otherwise infringes upon Canadian sover-
eignty.10 3 This threshold determination must be made before
any retaliatory action can be taken pursuant to the statute.
Thus, FEMA, is designed to take effect only "after diplomatic
efforts have been exhausted and irrenconcilable policy differ-
ences remain." 0
4
B. United States Interests and the Need for a Treaty
FEMA is a vehicle to force the United States to agree to
resolve discovery conflicts inter-governmentally, and not in a
unilateral fashion by United States courts. 10 5 It is intended to
97. Id.
98. Id. at 360-61.
99. The Canadian Parliament recently established a new agency called Invest-
ment Canada in order to encourage foreign investment. See House of Commons De-
bates, supra note 81, at 1189.
100. See Senate Debates, supra note 45, at 360.
101. See Senate Debates, supra note 45, at 361; House of Commons Debates,
supra note 81, at 1181.
102. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, §§ 3(1), 5(1) & 8(1) (1985).
103. Id.
104. House of Commons Debates, supra note 81, at 1182.
105. Senate Debates, supra note 45, at 362.
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be a shield, not a sword, "designed to ensure the preservation
of Canadian authority in Canadian territority."'' 1 6 Nonethe-
less, it can be used as a sword because it gives the Canadian
Attorney General discretion to obtain a court order to prevent
the removal from Canada of documents relevant to foreign
proceedings.10 7 Indeed, FEMA is a powerful tool which can
have serious implications for future United States extraterrito-
rial discovery in Canada. Accordingly, it is in the best interest
of the United States to look upon the statute's enactment as a
signal to be more respectful of Canadian sovereignty when en-
forcing discovery requests. If not, the ability of the United
States to obtain documents located in Canada relevant to
United States judicial proceedings will be in jeopardy.10 8
The United States has already demonstrated an interest in
mitigating discovery conflicts with Canada. A criminal discov-
ery treaty between Canada and the United States was signed in
1985 and is awaiting ratification. 0 9 In 1984, the two nations
entered into a new Understanding concerning antitrust discov-
ery.110 The Understanding provides detailed provisions for
notification,"' consultation," 2 and information gathering, 'ts
at the early stages of antitrust investigations or proceedings
that are conducted by either country. It also calls for similar
inter-governmental participation in private antitrust actions.'14
106. Id.
107. CAN. STAT. ch. 49, § 4 (1985).
108. See Note, Compelling Production, supra note 19, at 908.
109. Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, done at
Quebec City, March 18, 1985 (copy on file at the Fordham International L aw Journal).
110. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation
and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, reprinted
in 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Understanding]. This Understanding was
meant to supercede previous similar agreements between the two countries regard-
ing antitrust discovery-the Fulton-Rogers Understanding and its successor, the Bas-
ford-Mitchell Understanding. Id. § 12. Both suffered from procedural and substan-
tive defects which rendered them relatively ineffective in impeding or resolving anti-
trust conflicts between the countries. See generally Campbell, supra note 2; Comment,
The Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Application of National
Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6
Nw. J. Irr'L L. Bus. 1065, 1082-86 (1984-85) [hereinafter Comment, New Guidelines].
111. See 1984 Understanding, supra note 110, §§ 2-3.
112. Id. §§4-5.
113. Id. §§ 8-9.
114. Id. § 11.
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The overall effectiveness of the new Understanding is ques-
tionable," 5 however, as indicated by Canada's adoption of
FEMA less than a year after the 1984 Understanding entered
into force." 16 Accordingly, a formal treaty regarding all civil
discovery is needed, 1 7 which will provide a definite framework
for resolving conflicts involving competing national policies, as
well as procedural devices for obtaining evidence. ' 8
C. Proposed Provisions of a Canada-United States Extraterritorial
Civil Discovery Treaty
A civil discovery treaty between Canada and the United
States should not include a provision that gives either party the
option to ignore agreed procedures,' '9 and should provide for
115. As a vehicle to minimize potential discovery conflicts between the United
States and Canada, the 1984 Understanding is weak in three respects. First, it specifi-
cally states that it is an understanding and not an agreement, 1984 Understanding,
supra note 110, § 12, indicating that the United States need not accord it such weight
as an agreement or treaty. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court indicated that the
word 'treaty' in an act of Congress may encompass executive agreements, absent
contrary legislative intent. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 36 (1982). Sec-
ondly, although both the United States and Canada agree to give "careful considera-
tion to the significant national interests of the other," 1984 Understanding, supra note
110, § 6, the Understanding does not contain means to ensure that competing na-
tional interests will be fairly reconciled. Comment, New Guidelines, supra note 110, at
1068. It is precisely when there is a clear divergence between the policies of both
countries that tensions are high and clear guidance is needed. Finally, the 1984 Un-
derstanding does nothing to minimize discovery disagreements between the United
States and Canada in other areas of civil litigation, aside from private antitrust ac-
tions. 1984 Understanding, supra note 110, § 11. But cf. 1 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 796
(1984 Understanding successful in mitigating discovery conflicts between United States
and Canada in recent Justice Department investigation regarding takeover of Cana-
dian firm by United States firm).
116. The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act was entered into force in Febru-
ary of 1985. 2 B. RISTAU, supra note 95, at CI-32A.
117. See Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Re-
cent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 773 (1974) (advocates adoption of antitrust discovery treaty be-
tween, at least, the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands and
Canada).
118. See 1 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 795.
119. The ability of a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, done March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, T.I.A.S. No.7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, to refuse to follow agreed procedures has
been a factor leading to its ineffectiveness in facilitating cooperative extraterritorial
discovery. Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 19, at 851-52; see also Atwood, Blocking
Statutes and Sovereign Compulsion: Recent Developments and the Proposed Restatement, 1985
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 327, 333 (B. Hawk ed. 1986) (the Hague Convention has
been of little assistance in antitrust litigation because Art. 23 of the Convention au-
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the channelling of irreconcilable conflicts to the diplomatic
level.' 20  For instance, a special committee can be appointed
with one delegate chosen by each country and a third delegate
appointed by both. While diplomatic negotiations are pend-
ing, a final determination of the case should be suspended and
no sanctions imposed on the noncomplying party.' 2' To en-
sure that conflicting national interests be fairly reconciled
where intergovernmental discussions fail, the treaty should
provide for an arbitration mechanism to permit an impartial
party, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development' 2  (OECD), to resolve the dispute. 23 Court in-
quires should be limited to evidentiary determinations of the
relevancy of the documents in question and whether, if rele-
vant, they can be obtained without resorting to an extraterrito-
rial order.
Finally, the treaty should supply incentives for parties to
obey discovery orders, in order to avoid the abuse of the diplo-
matic process for dilatory purposes. Severe sanctions should
be imposed if a noncomplying party did not attempt to secure
a waiver of the blocking law, "courted the legal impedi-
ments" 24 by deliberately placing documents outside the juris-
diction of the court in anticipation of litigation, or otherwise
acted in bad faith. For example, the treaty could impose ret-
thorizes a signatory to declare at the time of ratification that it will not cooperate in
pretrial discovery of documents as conducted in common law countries). Canada is
not a signatory to the Convention. Note, Anschuetz, International Discovery American-
Style, and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 87, 88 n. 15 (1986).
For a broad discussion of the Hague Convention, see Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery:
Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1986);
Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad for Commercial Matters; Several
Notes Concerning its Scope, Methods and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031
(1984); Note, Gathering Evidence Abroad: The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited, 16 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 963 (1984).
120. See Note, supra note 117, at 773 (recognizes need for diplomatic negotia-
tion provisions in general antitrust discovery agreement).
121. Id.
122. The OECD has been active in encouraging business cooperation and mini-
mization of discovery conflicts between nations, particularly in the antitrust context.
1 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 741.
123. Note, supra note 117, at 773-74.
124. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958) (a finding that one has deliberately
courted legal impediments can have a vital bearing on the justification for dismissal
of the action).
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roactive monetary sanctions computed from the original day
the order was disobeyed.
CONCLUSION
FEMA is the result of frustrated Canadian attempts to
block intrusive United States discovery orders. The potent en-
forcement provisions of the statute are meant to signal to the
United States the strong interest Canada has in protecting it-
self from extraterritorial discovery which infringes on its sover-
eignty. The United States should respond to this outcry by en-
tering into a formal civil discovery agreement with Canada,
which will minimize future conflicts by indicating mutual re-
spect for the sovereign interests of both nations.
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